Space The Vital Frontier

Space is essential to everyday life – think GPS, for example – but its equally vital role in defence is often forgotten. This is partly because, unlike the other domains, space is not immediately obvious or visible. Space is often the invisible enabler and, because it is usually operating smoothly, it is not just taken for granted, but altogether forgotten.

The UK Ministry of Defence has stated that “the vast majority of operations could not be sustained without space capabilities”. This includes several elements:

• GPS for navigation and crucial timing signals, used not only for the tracking of troops, but also for guided munitions.

• Satellite Communications (SATCOM) for beyond line-of-sight communications (including ships and aircraft).

• Space-enabled intelligence (such as satellite imagery and radar information) that provides surveillance and reconnaissance.

The UK is not altogether new to space and as such owns the legacy system Skynet, which provides secure SATCOM links. In other areas, however, the UK is still in the process of collating its capabilities. For example, the sovereign constellation ISTARI, intended to supplement ISR, was announced at the same time as the Defence Space Strategy in 2022, but the project launch is not planned until 2026. Often, the UK relies on other states for capabilities. For navigation, for example, the UK is entirely reliant on the US for the availability of GPS (the European version, Galileo, is no longer accessible to the UK as a result of Brexit). The UK also depends on commercial providers – for example, Babcock manages and operates the Skynet constellation. With UK sovereign space assets limited, this spells two necessities for the future: resilience, and commercial tie-ins.

The Importance of Resilience

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the fact that space is by no means off limits in modern conflict: the satellite-enabled internet provider Viasat experienced a cyber-attack on the morning of the invasion in February 2022. Shortly after, Starlink seemed to have been targeted via electromagnetic and cyber means. Since the Russian troops achieved their originally planned positioning, widespread GPS jamming and spoofing has been taking place, also affecting Western weapons systems such as Excalibur, HIMARS and JDAM. It is evident that disruption in the electromagnetic spectrum is to be expected in any future conflict; this could mean the limited availability, if not complete absence, of certain communications systems and navigational data. This means that resilience is required to ensure the availability of crucial services.

Space is often the invisible enabler and, because it is usually operating smoothly, it is not just taken for granted, but altogether forgotten

Communications systems already have a PACE approach – primary, alternative, contingency and emergency – to ensure there are several layers on which to fall back. It would be useful to apply a similar thinking to space systems, especially for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), where the UK is entirely reliant on the US GPS system. The MoD’s Space Industrial Plan included a proposal for “MoD Time” as a “system of last resort” to ensure that timing signals are available continuously. A further way to increase the resilience of space systems is the use of the commercial sector.

Working with the Commercial Sector

The commercial space sector has seen exponential growth over the past decade, in some cases outpacing the developments of sovereign space actors with its innovations. Making use of the commercial sector – by buying into already existing services, rather than procuring a sovereign asset – makes sense. This is happening to some extent already; however, the commercial sector often laments the lack of clarity for requirements and the overbearing bureaucracy of procurement processes, which are often unfit for smaller space companies. Meanwhile, the lack of communication around long-term planning and asset procurement makes it difficult for industry to plan ahead and provide services accordingly. This is despite the promise stated in the Defence Space Strategy that “defence investment through a blend of assured commercial and military grade solutions will continue to increase flexibility, adaptability, tempo, resilience and overall agility of the Armed Forces”. One solution might be found in the communication of a clear strategy that guarantees open channels of communications – similar to the US Space Force Commercial Space Strategy, which further sets out questions of increased risk for commercial companies – for instance, what happens when a commercial asset is attacked while in the service of a government actor.

The Defence Space Strategy outlined the concept of “own, collaborate or access” (OCA): the ways in which space services can be procured. The realisation has already set in at Space Command that perhaps the order of priority of OCA is misguided, and tie-ins with the commercial sector and allies should be prioritised more, similar to the US Space Force approach of “exploit what we have, buy what we can, and build what we must”. Clear priorities must be set in accordance with the diversity of space services and assets required – there is no “one size fits all” approach when it comes to the complex and multi-layered system of space defence.

The Detection of and Response to Space Threats

A final consideration is the detection of and response to space threats. While we have observed non-kinetic attacks on satellites through electromagnetic and cyber countermeasures in Ukraine the UK’s competitors and adversaries are capable of further threats – not only kinetic anti-satellite weapons, but also in-orbit surveillance and potential intercepts. Russia demonstrated its capability to kinetically destroy a satellite in 2021, using a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon – a system that China tested back in 2007. Further, Russian satellites have been seen moving close to US military satellites and a joint French-Italian constellation. Whether these missions served the purpose of photographing the sensitive assets, or potentially intercepting their signals, or if they were simply activity intended to cause concern is difficult to tell. However, not all threats to satellites are of a nefarious nature: space debris does not choose its victims and neither do solar flares that can expose satellites to increased radiation and atmospheric drag.

The lack of communication around long-term planning and asset procurement makes it difficult for industry to plan ahead and provide services accordingly

Whether environmental or nefarious space threats, the UK must be able to keep an eye on its own assets and their surroundings, and be able to respond to potential threats in a timely manner. With the radar facility at RAF Fylingdales, the UK receives access to the space data provided by the US, which host the most comprehensive space data collection available. It is important, however, that the UK continues to invest in its own Space Domain Awareness capabilities to improve its threat assessment processes, enabling fast and apt reactions.

What Now?

As the new UK government sets its sights on a new defence review, it is evident that space can and should not be forgotten – to do so would be to undermine the very foundation on which UK defence capabilities are built. Not investing now in the ability to detect and respond to threats, as well as the resilience of space assets, risks limiting the UK’s ability to act and react in potential conflict scenarios in the future. It is important to invest now in the resilience of systems and guarantee access to systems through tie-ins with allies and commercial partners. NATO, as it builds up its space capabilities through its member states, will continue to be a crucial conduit for Western space collaboration. This, however, should not prevent the UK from looking for further like-minded allies with whom to invest in space.

Juliana Suess is the Research Fellow on Space Security as part of the Military Sciences team at RUSI and is the host of the podcast War in Space.